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Abstract 
The prevailing models of liquidity traps suggest that a deflationary trap is a stable steady state in a multiple equilibria 
model. These models implicitly assume that the central bank accelerates the process of disinflation by following a 
Taylor rule even though there is a long run positive relationship between the nominal interest rate and inflation rate. 
This paper presents a reduced-form model that integrates liquidity effects into the analysis of interest rate rules to 
generalize the previous results about uniqueness, determinacy, and dynamic property of the economy.
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     1. Interest Rate Rules and Liquidity Traps
Consider a simple dynamic economy with ﬂexible prices in which (i) the level of output
is exogenous, (ii) the representative household’s behavior is expressed by the standard Euler
equation, and (iii) the central bank follows a Taylor-type interest rate rule. In a steady
state, the interest rate rule is expressed by I = AΠα, where I is the gross nominal interest
rate, Π is the inﬂation factor, A > 0 is a scale parameter, and α > 0. According to Leeper
(1991), monetary policy is said to be “active” if α > 1 and “passive” if α < 1. Since the
level of output is exogenous, monetary policy reacts only to inﬂation.1
The standard Euler equation implies that in a steady state, the gross real interest rate
R equals the inverse of the household’s discount factor, 1/β.2 Then the Fisher equation
is I = RΠ = β¡1Π. Substitute this into I = AΠα to obtain Π = (Aβ)
1/(1¡α). Thus, the
inﬂation rate is easily expressed in terms of parameters. According to this simple model,
the central bank should be able to control inﬂation perfectly by choosing appropriately the
policy parameters A and α.
It has become conventional to describe a deﬂationary trap in this environment by adding
the zero lower bound (ZLB) on the nominal interest rate to the analysis. When the rate of
inﬂation starts falling, sooner or later the nominal interest rate will hit the ZLB. In this case,
the Fisher equation implies that Π = R¡1 = β, which is the household’s discount factor and
is therefore less than one. In this simple economy, deﬂation occurs whenever the nominal








Figure 1: Monetary policy is passive
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Figure 2: Monetary policy is active
Figures 1 and 2 depict how interest rate rules combined with the ZLB can generate a
deﬂationary steady state. Figure 1 depicts the case in which monetary policy is passive, or
α ∈ (0,1). As is clear from the ﬁgure, the presence of the ZLB has no implication for the
1Clarida et al. (1998) found that the interest rate does not react strongly to the output gap in major
countries. For example, the estimated output gap coeﬃcient is 0.08 for the Bank of Japan, while the
coeﬃcient on the inﬂation gap is 2.04.
2This amounts to say that the real interest rate equals the natural rate of interest.
1number of steady-state equilibria. However, it causes multiple equilibria if monetary policy
is active, or α > 1. As in Figure 2, active policy combined with the ZLB implies two steady
states. Whether or not the economy actually hits the ZLB, and hence the deﬂationary trap,
can be veriﬁed by considering the model’s dynamic properties. The model’s dynamics and
determinacy are strongly inﬂuenced by (i) whether the interest rate rule is forward-looking
or backward-looking, and (ii) whether there is an equilibrium rejection device such as the
transversality condition (TVC).3
Proposition 1 If monetary policy is passive (α ∈ (0,1)), then (i) there is a unique steady
state, (ii) the steady state is stable under the backward-looking rule, and (iii) the steady state
is unstable under the forward-looking rule.
Part (i) is evident from Figure 1. Let us prove part (ii). The case of the backward-looking
interest rate rule is described by the following system of diﬀerence equations, It = β¡1Πt
and It = AΠα
t¡1. From these equations it is easy to obtain Πt = βAΠα
t¡1, from which it is
easy to verify that the steady state is stable since α ∈ (0,1). Once the stability properties
of the model are established, it is easy to show the following.
Proposition 2 Suppose monetary policy is passive and there is an equilibrium rejection
device such as the TVC, then (i) the steady state is indeterminate under the backward-
looking rule, and (ii) the steady state is determinate under the forward-looking rule.
The key is that the TVC rejects any divergent path as an equilibrium.4 Thus, a unique
unstable steady state implies that the steady state is the only possible equilibrium for any
t. In contrast, a stable steady state implies that there is an inﬁnity of convergent paths to
the steady state—the steady state is indeterminate.
Proposition 3 If monetary policy is active (α > 1), then (i) there are two steady states,
one of which is deﬂationary, (ii) the inﬂationary steady state is stable under the forward-
looking rule, and (iii) the inﬂationary steady state is unstable under the backward-looking
rule.
A stable deﬂationary steady state, or a deﬂationary trap, arises when monetary policy
is active (α > 1) and backward-looking. Suppose that there is a decrease in inﬂation near
the inﬂationary steady state. The central bank reduces the nominal interest rate according
3It might be hard to imagine the role of TVC in this reduced-form model since the household optimization
is implicit. Since TVC is usually model-speciﬁc, it may be replaced with any other condition that rules out
unbounded sequences of candidate equilibria.
4This statement is not universally accepted. For example, Cochrane (2006) argues, “the expectation of
an explosion is perfectly reasonable—If the Fed were committed to raising interest rates more than 1–1 with
inﬂation, if we lived in a world of constant real rates, so this translates into a commitment to raise future
inﬂation more than 1–1 with past inﬂation, then my expectation is that we’ll see hyperinﬂation.” According
to Cochrane (2006) and Woodford (2003), a non-Ricardian ﬁscal regime is needed as an equilibrium rejection
device. Since the predictions of the model depend profoundly on whether there is an equilibrium rejection
device, I choose to present both cases in this paper.
2to the interest rate rule, It = AΠα
t¡1. However, in the frictionless pure-exchange economy, a
reduction in the nominal interest rate reduces the inﬂation rate further because of the Fisher
equation with a predetermined real interest rate, Πt = βIt. Thus, in this simple economy,
the interest rate rule accelerates the process of disinﬂation. Thus, the nominal interest rate
will eventually hit the ZLB, at which Π = β < 1 holds.
Ruling out equilibrium paths in an environment with two steady states is a subject
of debate (Cochrane, 2006). There seems to be no single way to interpret mathematical
results. To limit the debate, I focus on the region between the inﬂationary steady state and
the deﬂationary steady state. In this region, there is no divergent path, so the question to be
addressed is whether the deﬂationary steady state is stable or not. If the deﬂationary steady
state is stable, then there is a deﬂationary trap. With the TVC, stability implies that there
is an inﬁnity of paths leading to the trap. It is important to note here that Taylor’s (2001)
own interpretation of Figure 2 is that the deﬂationary steady state is unstable, so the issue
is not whether it is a trap, but whether the economy gets into the deﬂationary spiral—the
region on the left of the (unstable) deﬂationary steady state. Thus, the interpretation of
Figure 2 diﬀers profoundly, depending upon whether or not the analysis uses a device that
rules out divergent paths.
2. Liquidity Eﬀects and Interest Rate Rules
Although the above argument has become the building block of the analyses of liquidity
traps,5 it misses an important aspect. When disinﬂation accelerates and the central bank
wishes to avoid getting into a deﬂationary trap, why does not the central bank raise the
nominal interest rate, instead of reducing it? If the long-run Fisher relation is exploitable,
then the central bank should be able to control inﬂation simply by pegging the nominal
interest rate. In other words, in the basic model, it is the central bank that creates a
deﬂationary trap (Benhabib et al., 2001, 2002). In this sense, it is plausible to think that a
Taylor rule, or monetary policy in general, presumes the existence of the liquidity eﬀect or
monetary nonneutrality.6
To generalize the analysis, suppose that the standard Fisher equation is replaced with
I = F(Π),
which is a generalization of the Fisher equation because it includes the Fisher equation as
a special case when F(Π) = RΠ. In what follows I do not exclude the case where there is a
persistent liquidity eﬀect: F 0(·) < 0. This states that the nominal interest rate and inﬂation
rate are negatively related, and I do not argue whether there is such an eﬀect at all (Melvin,
1983; Reichenstein, 1987; Gordon and Leeper, 1994; Christiano, 1995; Pagan and Robertson,
5Figure 2 has been popularized by Taylor (2001), Benhabib et al. (2001, 2002) and textbooks such as
Walsh (2003) and Woodford (2003).
6Christiano (1995) deﬁnes the liquidity eﬀect as “an exogenous, persistent, upward shock in the growth
rate of the monetary base, engineered by the central bank and not associated with any current or prospective
adjustment in distortionary taxes, drives the nominal rate of interest down for a signiﬁcant period of time.”
See also Mishkin (2007).
31995; Christiano et al., 1996). A related result appears in Nakajima (2006), in which the
negative relationship is derived from a dynamic general equilibrium model with sticky prices
and segmented markets.7 Here, the exact mechanism that generates the liquidity eﬀect is
not described. Instead, this paper presents implications of the presence of the liquidity eﬀect
for the conduct of monetary policy.
A steady state of the model is given by the solution to I = AΠα and I = F(Π). If
F(Π) is decreasing and α > 0, there is a unique steady state even with the ZLB. In other
words, if there is a persistent liquidity eﬀect, then the analysis above suggests that there is
no liquidity trap because the steady state is unique.
In what follows I present some dynamic properties of the model. First, consider a
backward-looking Taylor rule. The law of motion for this economy is driven by the diﬀerence
equations It = AΠα












where ε(Π) ≡ F 0(Π)Π/F is the elasticity of F(Π) with respect to Π. Note that with
a persistent liquidity eﬀect, ε < 0. Note also that, with the standard Fisher equation,
ε(Π) = 1. It is then routine (Azariadis (1993), Chapter 2) to establish that the sequence
{Πt} exhibits damped oscillations and converges to the steady state if −1 < α/ε < 0, and
it exhibits explosive oscillations if α/ε < −1. Consider a forward-looking Taylor rule. The
law of motion is given by It = AΠα
t+1 and It = F(Πt), from which it is easy to verify that
AΠα
t+1 = F(Πt). Then, dΠt+1/dΠt = ε(Π)/α. Thus, the sequence {Πt} exhibits damped
oscillations and converges to the steady state if −1 < ε/α < 0, and it exhibits explosive
oscillations if ε/α < −1. To summarize:
Proposition 4 Suppose there is no equilibrium rejection device. (i) Under a backward-
looking rule, the steady state is stable if α < −ε. It exhibits explosive oscillations if −ε < α.
(ii) Under a forward-looking rule, the steady state is stable if −ε < α. It exhibits explosive
oscillations if α < −ε.
If we live in a world without an equilibrium rejection device, then, for stability, the central
bank should set α small under a backward-looking rule and it should set α large under a
forward-looking rule. An interesting feature of the model is that the dynamic properties
are characterized by comparing the two elasticity measures, α and ε. This generalizes the
analysis in the literature, in which ε = 1 holds.
Proposition 5 Suppose there is an equilibrium rejection device such as the TVC. (i) Under
a backward-looking rule, the steady state is determinate if −ε < α. (ii) Under a forward-
looking rule, the steady state is determinate if α < −ε.
7It is important to note that in the existing general equilibrium models with liquidity eﬀects, the eﬀects
do not last. By contrast, this paper allows for the scenario in which a liquidity eﬀect is persistent. According
to Mishkin (2007), such a case arises when the liquidity eﬀect dominates the oﬀsetting eﬀects such as the
price level eﬀect and the expected inﬂation eﬀect. Using identiﬁed VARs, Gordon and Leeper (1994) found
that the liquidity eﬀect lasts 8 months. Christiano et al. (1996) used other VARs to ﬁnd a strong liquidity
eﬀect.
4As usual, the implication will be reversed if there is an equilibrium rejection device.
For determinacy, the central bank should set α large under a backward-looking rule and it
should set α small under a forward-looking rule.
3. Conclusion
An important point made in this paper is that although it is convenient to describe
a deﬂationary trap by combining Taylor rules and the ZLB of the nominal interest rate,
such a model implicitly assumes that the central bank accelerates the process of disinﬂation
even though there is a positive relationship between the nominal interest rate and inﬂation
rate. In this sense, it is plausible to think that policy makers presume the presence of the
liquidity eﬀect. Based on this observation, this paper presented a reduced-form model that
generalizes the previous models to include liquidity eﬀects.
The exercises performed in this paper suggest that if there is a persistent liquidity eﬀect,
then there is no deﬂationary trap. One of the keys to understanding a deﬂationary trap is
that there might be a gap between the liquidity eﬀect perceived by the central bank and
the actual liquidity eﬀect. This suggests a direction for future research. It is worthwhile to
explore a model in which there is uncertainty regarding (i) the strength of the liquidity eﬀect
and (ii) how long the eﬀect will last. Such an analysis requires a fully speciﬁed dynamic
general equilibrium model.
A limitation of this study is to try to understand a deﬂationary trap within an endowment
economy. An important line of future research involves a study of a Taylor rule with the ZLB
in a production economy that generates a strong liquidity eﬀect. Another important line of
inquiry is to consider whether policy switching (Davig and Leeper, 2007) will eliminate a
deﬂationary trap. Although it is ultimately necessary to build full DSGE models to tackle
these issues, writing down a simple reduced-form model is a useful starting point.
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